Overview
Title
Agency Information Collection Activities: Announcement of Board Approval Under Delegated Authority and Submission to OMB
Agencies
ELI5 AI
The Federal Reserve System is keeping a rule that says banks have to tell their bosses really fast if a serious computer problem happens, like if the computer breaks for more than four hours. They are doing this for three more years, and nobody said anything about it during the time when people could have shared their thoughts.
Summary AI
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has decided to extend the Computer-Security Incident Notification rule for another three years without making any changes. This rule requires banks and certain financial service providers to promptly notify their federal regulators about serious computer-security incidents. They must report these incidents within 36 hours after identifying them if they lead to significant service disruptions lasting four hours or more. Despite a comment period, the Board received no feedback on this proposal.
Abstract
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) is adopting a proposal to extend for three years, without revision, the Computer-Security Incident Notification (FR 2231; OMB No. 7100-0384).
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Sources
AnalysisAI
The document discusses a policy decision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to extend, without revision, the Computer-Security Incident Notification rule for another three years. This rule applies to banks and certain financial service providers, mandating them to notify their federal regulators promptly about significant computer-security incidents. Notifications must occur no later than 36 hours after recognizing that an incident has occurred if it leads to considerable service disruptions lasting four hours or more.
Summary of the Decision
The Federal Reserve's decision signifies a recognition of ongoing cybersecurity concerns within the banking sector. By maintaining this rule, the Board aims to ensure that financial institutions remain vigilant and proactive in addressing cybersecurity threats that could impact financial stability.
Significant Issues and Concerns
One notable aspect of the document is the absence of comments from the public during the open comment period. This lack of engagement could indicate several underlying issues. For instance, it might suggest that awareness of the comment process is insufficient or that stakeholders may not fully understand the implications and significance of the rule. Additionally, while the document provides estimates on the burdens placed on respondents in terms of hours, it lacks clarity on how these figures were derived, especially given the fast-paced evolution of technology, which could significantly affect these estimates.
Another concern is the lack of specific cost information associated with implementing and maintaining compliance with this rule. Understanding these costs is crucial for assessing whether the rule's enforcement constitutes a financially sound strategy or if it could lead to unnecessary expenditure. Moreover, there is little explanation or justification for not revising the existing rule, which could raise questions about whether the current measures are adequate given the increasingly sophisticated nature of cybersecurity threats.
Impact on the Public
For the general public, particularly those in the finance sector, this decision reinforces the importance of cybersecurity. While the decision aims to protect consumers by ensuring financial institutions address cybersecurity events promptly, the broader public might not feel a direct impact unless significant breaches occur. For consumers, however, this rule can provide some reassurance that systemic safeguards against cyber threats are actively monitored and enforced.
Impact on Stakeholders
The primary stakeholders affected by this rule include U.S. bank holding companies, state member banks, and other financial institutions required to comply with the notification requirements. For these stakeholders, the rule necessitates the maintenance of robust cybersecurity protocols and prompt incident response procedures. While this ensures a higher industry standard for cybersecurity, it also places a continuing operational burden on these institutions, potentially affecting smaller entities more severely due to limited resources.
While maintaining the rule without changes might imply stability for some, it could potentially be a missed opportunity for addressing new and emerging cybersecurity challenges. Therefore, the transparency and clarity in communicating these requirements could benefit stakeholders by aiding comprehension and compliance, thereby enhancing overall cybersecurity resilience across the sector.
Issues
• The document does not provide specific information on the costs associated with the extension of the Computer-Security Incident Notification (FR 2231). Without such information, it is difficult to assess potential wasteful spending.
• The language in the section 'General description of collection’ that explains reporting requirements related to ‘computer-security incidents’ could be clearer, particularly regarding the definitions of 'computer-security incident' and 'notification incident'.
• There is no detailed justification or explanation for the lack of revisions to the FR 2231, which might raise concerns about the adequacy of the current measures in place considering evolving cybersecurity threats.
• The document mentions that no public comments were received, but it does not explore possible reasons for this lack of engagement, which could include issues with public awareness or communication regarding the comment period.
• While the document provides estimates on respondent burden hours, it does not specify how these estimates were calculated or if they consider potential updates in technology or processes that could affect reporting time.